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ABSTRACT 
The Groves mechanism and k"' price auctions are well-known examples of pivot
mechanisms. In this paper an analogous pivot mechanism is defined for probability relevation and 
then the Bayesian equilibria are characterized for the three pivot mechanisms. The main result is 
that in Bayesian games with these pivot mechanisms, equilibria must satisfy a simple fixed point 
condition. The result does not require signal ordering properties and thus generalizes and simplifies 
results by Milgrom and others. When the fixed point is unique there is "no regret." The result also 
holds for games less structured than Bayesian games (where the common knowledge and 
consistency assumptions are relaxed). 
The pivot mechanism in probability revelation is shown to generalize and characterize 
proper scoring rules. The characterization yields an optimization of research incentives for proper 
scoring rules and suggests that under some conditions the new mechanisms, which are pivot 
mechanisms but not proper scoring rules, outperform proper scoring rules. 
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"Rational actors" make two types of judgment: one of belief (probability) and the other of 
preference (utility or willingness to pay). Although these two judgments are brought symmetrically
together in the formation of an expected utility, applications using revealed probabilities tend to 
differ from those using revealed valuations. Mechanisms revealing preferences arise in the theory of 
auctions (Milgrom and Weber [1982)) and public goods (Green and Laffont [1979)). Mechanisms 
for revealing probabilities arise in attempts to establish incentive compatible rules of liability, 
forecasting, and risk assessment (Savage [1971 ]). 
A chemical firm, facing a rule of strict liability, may want its toxicologists to assess the 
probability that a given chemical is toxic. Weather forecasters routinely make probabilistic 
predictions of precipitation, cloud cover, and other conditions. In a firm the director of R and D may 
ask experts to assess the probability that various projects will meet performance targets at given 
costs and dates. In the regulation of nuclear power, decisions on investments in safety are based on 
quantitative assessments of the probabilities of accidents. 
Concern with incentive compatibility in probability revelation has a long history, going back 
from Bayes to Ramsey, de Finetti, and Savage. Savage [1971 ]  devoted his last paper to proper 
scoring rules, a class of mechanisms for revealing probability. (Proper scoring rules are virtually the 
only probability revealing mechanisms to have received formal study.) In experimental economics, 
proper scoring rules have been used by Grether [198 1 ]  and McKelvey and Page [1985]. Eleven 
years before Vickery's seminal paper on incentive compatibility and second price auctions, Brier 
[ 1950] proposed a mechanism for eliciting probabilistic weather forecasting which would be 
immune to manipulation, or as he put it, "playing the system." Since 1965 his mechanism, a proper 
scoring rule, has been widely adopted in weather forecasting (Murphy and Winkler [1985]). 
Interestingly, Savage traced his idea for characterizing proper scoring rules to Marschak's 
seller's price auction, and Green and Laffont traced the "essence" of the Groves mechanism to the 
same source. The identification of a common source suggests a parallel between the two theories of 
relevation mechanism (probability and preference). However, by and large the two theories have 
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grown separately, and the parallel has not been developed. Pivot mechanisms play a central role in 
the Groves mechanism, but Savage, and others, defined proper scoring rules as non-pivot 
mechanisms. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of pivot mechanisms in probability revelation 
and to bring out the parallel between probability and preference revelation. I begin by defining a 
Bayesian game for pivot mechanisms in probability revelation. The main result (Theorem 1)  is that 
the Bayesian equilibria for this game satisfy, as a necessary condition, a fixed point property. The 
fixed point property is also a necessary condition for the Bayesian equilibria of other Bayesian 
games with pivot mechanisms. In particular the property characterizes the Groves mechanism for 
public goods (Theorem 3) and k111 price auctions (immediate consequence of Theorem 3).
Further, the fixed point property obtains for games less structured then Bayesian games. So, 
the theorems are derived with weak.er assumptions, compared to those of a Bayesian game, but apply 
to the equilibria of a Bayesian game as a specialization. In the more general setting, following the
parallel between probability and preference revelation in the latter direction, I use the idea of 
Theorem 1 to extend the basic theorem of the Groves mechanism (that truthful reporting is a 
dominant strategy) to the case where there can be conditional valuations. For the k'" price auction I
derive a fixed point characterization of equilibria similar to Milgrom's theorem 3.1 [198 1 ] ,  but with 
weak.er assumptions (I do not require signal ordering assumptions and the consistency assumptions 
of Bayesian games.) 
Following the parallel in the direction of probability revelation, I show (Theorem 5) that 
pivot mechanisms are equivalent, in expectation, to a generalization of proper scoring rules. I use 
this characterization of proper scoring rules to obtain the proper scoring rule with optimal research 
incentives (Theorem 6). And by Monte Carlo methods I show that at least for some specific cases 
more general pivot mechanisms outperfonn proper scoring rules. 
Pivot mechanisms in Bayesians games, both for probability revelation and for preference 
revelation, provide a simple context which may help clarify the relationship between Bayesian 
games and rational expectations equilibria. I show (Theorem 2 and 4) that when the fixed point is 
unique, equilibria of the Bayesian (and less structured) games are "regret free," a property Green and 
Laffont [ 1985] call "posterior implementability." It appears that a rational expectations equilibrium 
is close to, but not quite, a Bayesian equilibrium with the "regret free" property. 
The paPer is organized as follows. In section 1 ,  I define pivot mechanisms as a special class
of probability revelation mechanisms, define Bayesian strategies for the less structured game, derive 
the fixed point characterization for Bayesian strategies in response to pivot mechanisms, and find 
sufficient conditions for the regret-free property. In section 2, I derive the corresponding fixed point 
and regret-free properties for the well-known pivot mechanisms in preference revelation-Groves 
mechanisms and k'" price auctions. In this section, I discuss how the fixed point and regret-free
properties can be interpreted to relate the concepts of Bayesian and rational expectations equilibria. 
In section 3, I show that pivot mechanisms can be used to characterize proper scoring rules. In 
section 4, I relax the assumption of risk neutrality. And finally, in section 5, I discuss some 
applications of pivot mechanisms in probability revelation. 
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1. PIVOT MECHANISMS IN PROBABILITY REVELATION
We begin by defining a Bayesian game of probability assessment. Denote: 
N = {l, . . . ,n} group of assessors 
X e {0,1} uncertain event be assessed 
Pr (X = 1) = p probability of event X = 1 
Y; e Yi i's private information 
ri(·):Yi � [0,1) a strategy function for i
R; = {ri(·)} i's strategy space 
ri = r; (yi) a strategy choice or report for i
q; (-):[0,l]''-1 � [0,1] aggregation function
qi =qi (r -i) a pivot for i, where
r - i = (r1 • . . . • r;-1.ri+l• · · · • r") 
ti = t; (r;.qi )()i's transfer or reward 
We use the notational conventions y = (y1, . . .  , y"), Y-i = (y1 • . . . ·Yi-1>Y;+1• . . .  , y"), 
Y = TIY;, Y-i = TIY1, and r_ ;(y-i) = (r1(y1) • . . .  , r;_1(y;-1).r;+1(y;+1) • . . .  , r"(y")) .i j'l'i 
Before i chooses ri (to be interpreted as his reported assessment of p ), i observes Yi but not
X, p, r1 U :F- i ) , or qi . To define a Bayesian game, we also assume:
A l  (CONSISTENCY IN BELIE F). There is a prior p(p,y) such that i 's belief after observing Yi 
can be written p(p,y-i ly;); 
A2 (COM¥0N KNOWLEDGE). The game form, including the functional forms qi(·), t;(·, . ,-),
and p(· ;) is common knowledge; 
we specify preferences by assuming that i 's utility is t; (and hence i is risk neutral); and we adopt 
the following solution concept: Bayesian Equilibrium . By definition, then-tuple (r1(·), • • •  , r11 (· ) ) is a 
Bayesian equilibrium if for each i e N and Y; e Y;, r; (y;) = r; maximizes
f[O,ll fr_i E [t;(r; ',q; (r - i(y-i )))() Ip ,y-i] p(p ,y_1 ly; )dpdy-i
over r; ' e [0,1]
(1.0) 
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The above specification of game foim, preferences and solution concept defines a Bayesian 
game. In a Bayesian equilibrium there are three consistency conditions, the first two being Al and 
A2. The third follows from the solution concept. In a Bayesian equilibrium i's belief about the 
others' equilibrium strategies must be coordinated with the others' beliefs about the others' 
strategies. That is, the (n-1)-tuple (riO• . . . , ri-10.ri+tO• . . .  ,r110) against which i maximizes in 
(1.0) is drawn from the same n-tuple (r1(·), • • •  ,r110) as the (n-1)-tuple against which} maximizes in 
(1.0). We will call this third consistency condition C3. 
When the transfer rule is pivotal (defined below), Bayesian equilibria satisfy a fixed point 
property, stated as follows: 
Suppose (r 1 ('), . • •  , r 11 0) is a Bayesian equilibrium. Denot� p(p ,qi I Yi) as the measure 
induced by qi = qi (r - i(y-1)) and p(p .Y-1 lyi) and write E [p I qi ,y;] = f p Pp lq.,y.(p I qi .Yi)dp .
Q I I 
Fixed Point Property . Let (r1('), • • •  , r11(')) be a Bayesian equilibrium. Then for any y e Y, 
qi = qi (r - i(y-1)) is a fixed point of E [p I ·,yi] . 
This property is sometimes enough to characterize symmetric Bayesian equilibria for 
invertible strategies (see Examples 1 and 2). We derive the property in Theorems 1 and 3 for games 
of less structure than Bayesian games. For Theorem 1 we modify the above described Bayesian 
game as follows: 
Drop A 1 and A2 and in their place assume:
A 1 '. Each i, after observing Yi and before reporting ri, foims a belief on (p ,q; ) , written as
the measure p; (p ,q; I Yi) .  
Define r; ( -) to be Bayesian strategy for i if, for each Yi e Yi , r; (J;) = r; maximizes
1 1 
f f E [ti(r/,qi,X) lp,q; ]pi(p,qi ly; )dpdq;0 0 
over r/ e [0,l] 
And in place of a Bayesian equilibrium for the solution concept, adopt the following 
solution concept: 
(1.1) 
The n -�ple (r; ('), ... , r 11 (')) is an equilibrium of Bayesian strategies, if for each i e N, ri O is
a Bayesian strategy for i. 
Note that when we have a Bayesian game with Al, A2 and a Bayesian equilibrium 
(r 10 • . . .• r 11 (')) we also have Ai' and (r1( ·), . . .  , r11 (')) is an equilibrium of Bayesian strategies.
However, when we have the weak.er game, assuming Ai' but not Al and A2, and (r1('),• • •  ,r11(')) is 
an equilibrium of Bayesian strategies, Al and A2 are not implied, and (r1('), • . •  ,r11(·)) may not be a 
Bayesian equilibrium (Example 3 is a counterexample). In the weak.er game, none of the three 
consistency conditions A 1, A2 and C3 are required to hold.
In what follows we can suppress the conditioning Yi without confusion, by writing
hi (p ,qi)= Pi (p ,qi I Y; ). Write:
1 
f i(p)=f h;(p,qi)dq;
0 
I 
gi (q; )  = f h; (p ,q; )dp0 
I 
Pi =E;(p)=f pf ;(p)dp = E; (X)0 
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Example (1). n = 2 and assume Al and A2. Each assessor knows (as common knowledge) that X is
a trial from a Bernoulli process with unknown parameter p, which is drawn from a uniform 
distribution over [0, 1 ] .  It is also common knowledge that each assessor will observe M independent
trials from the same process. The number of successes that i observes, Yi, is i's private infonnation. 
Assessor i's prior for p is uniform and his posterior, after observing Yi, is the beta 
distribution f; (p) - beta (1 +Yi, 1 + M - Y;) and where ii; = � : � . 
We define a pivot mechanism t as a transfer function t =(ti, . . .  , t,.) where 
(1-qi)A;(qi)+Bn ifX = 1 andri �qi 
Bi2 ifX =Oandr; �qi 
ti(ri,qi)()= qiAi(qi)+Bi2 ifX =Oandri <q; 
Bit ifX=landri <q; 
where A; : [0, 1] � R + is a continuous function and B ik is a constant. It turns out that even though i 
does not observe q; before reporting ri, and hence does not observe the function value ii; (qi), the 
function ii;(·) plays a central role in characterizing i's Bayesian strategy for pivot mechanisms (and 
thus for characterizing Bayesian equilibria). 
Theorem 1. For any pivot mechanism, if ii; O is continuous and g; O > 0, then i's Bayesian strategy
exists and is a fixed point of ii;('). 
Proof Assessor i's expected transfer, for a given p and qi and as a function of his report ri is, 
omitting subscript i , 
{
(1- q)A (q)p + (B 1 - Bi)p +B2 if r � q
E (t Ip ,q ,r) = 
qA(q)(l- p)+(B1- Bi)p +B2 if r <q
Taking the expectation over p and q, i's expected transfer as a function of r is 
I I 
T(r)=f f E(t lp,q,r)h(p,q)dpdq
0 0 
(1.2) 
1 r 
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= f dpf ((l - q)A(q)+B1 -BJ)ph(p,q)dq
0 0 
1 1 
+ f dp f (qA (q )(1 - p) + (B 1 -B vP )h (p ,q )dq + B 2 
0 r 
r 1 
=f dqf ((l -q)A(q)+B1 - BJ)php1q(p lq)g(q)dp
0 0 
1 1 
+ f dqf (qA(q)(l -p)+ (B1 -BJ)p)hp1q(p lq)g(q)dp +B2
r 0 
r 1 
=f (1 -q)A(q)p(q)g(q)dq +f qA(q)(l -p(q))g(q)dq
0 r 
1 
+(B1 -Bvf p(q)g(q)dq +B20 
r 
T(r)= f (j)(q) -q)A(q)g(q)dq +K
0 
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
for a constant K. Since A (q )g (q) > 0, if the maximum of T is attained at r* inside the unit interval
we must have ji(r*) = r*. If the maximum is attained at r* = 0, we must have p(O) � O; but p O � O 
(since p (· )  is the expectation of a probability), so jj(O) = 0. If the maximum is attained at r* = 1, we
must have p(l) � 1; but p (·) � 1, so p(l) = 1. Thus in each case the maximum occurs at a fixed point
of p('). Existence of a Bayesian strategy (i.e., existence of a global maximum for each Yi) is
guaranteed since TO is a continuous function over a compact set. 
Q.E.D. 
Figure .l illustrates the theorem. T (r) is made up of little slices like C, weighted by the
positive weights A (r)g(r). As long as p(r) > r ,  T(r) is increasing with r. Thus as r increases T
increases over the region (O ,r1), decreases over (r1 ,rz ), increases over (r2,r,Y and decreases over (r3,1). 
T (r v is a local minimum, and one of the two local maxima, T (r 1) and T (r 3), is the global maximum.
The conditions on gi (') and Pi(·) can be weakened while retaining the fixed point
characterization, or something similar to it. The assumption that gi (') > O (which can be interpreted
as a perfectness requirement on i's beliefs) is necessary for fi'i(·) to be defined everywhere on [0,1]. 
But we can allow gi to vanish over some regions. In Figure 2, such a region bridges the diagonal and
any r between r 4 and r 5 is a Bayesian strategy. In Figure 3, we allow Pi(·) to be defined over [O, 1]
but be discontinuous; and the Bayesian strategy is r 6•1 
Example (1) (Continued). Define qi  = 'i (i "# j). Suppose that for the information structure of
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Example (1), both assessors believe that the Bayesian strategies r;(·) and r20 are symmetric and
· 'bl d · () () ()( ' 12) Th h · b 
• -() l+yt+r-l(rj)mvert1 e; an wnte r 1 · = r 2 ·= r · i = , . en, w en i o serves Yi , Pi rj = 2 + 2M 
Write rt= r <Yt) for i's Bayesian report. At ri = r;" = r ( y;°), ii; (r;°) = �: � . But by Theorem 1 at the
• 
B · • - ( •) • d • 
1 + 2Yi s· thi h Id fi • . ' B . ayes1an strategy r i , p; r; = r; an so r i = 2 + 2M . mce s o s or any Yi , i s ayes1an
strategy is 
1+2yi
ri (yi ) = 2 + 2M . (1.5) 
Assessor i's Bayesian strategy is unique, given his beliefs, and ( r1( '), r2( -)) is a Bayesian equilibrium. 
Example (2). n = 2 and assume Al and A2. Each assessor knows thatX is a Bernoulli random
variable with known probability a.. If X = l, i observes M Bernoulli trials with parameter � > 0.5. If
X = 0, i observes M Bernoulli trials with parameter (1 - �). (The M trials i observes are independent,
conditional on � or (1- �). of the M trials j observes.) This structure of information is common
knowledge. The number of successes i observes is Yi , which is i's private information.
Then by Bayes Theorem 
M-2y ii; = Pr( X = 1lyi )=1/(1 +a.� 1) 
where�= (1 - a)/a. and �= iY<l - �). Define qi = ri U -:i"- i). We assume that each i believes that
r 1 ( ') = r 20 = r(' ) and r O is invertible. Then
ii; (q;) = 1/(1 + a.�
2M-2y,-2r-l(q1»
By Th.eorem l, when i observes y;" , at the Bayesian strategy r;" = r(y;°) we have ii; (r i  * ) = r;" so
2M-4y r; ( yi )  = 1/(1 + a.� 1). 
Again ( r1( '), r20) is a Bayesian equilibrium.
(1.6) 
(1.7 )
Example (3). n = 2 and qi = ri (i -:i"- j) but Al and A2 are not assumed. Assessor 1 believes that the
information structure is that of Example (1) except 1 believes that 2's signal is uncorrelated with X, 
and he does not believe r1( ') = r2( ·). Assessor 2 believes that the information structure is that of 
Example (2) except 2 believes that l 's signal is uncorrelated withX and he does not believe 
r10 = r2( '). Oearly neither Al nor A2 hold. Here,p1(q1 )  = .01 and l 's unique Bayesian strategy is
r1(y1 ) = �: �. Similarly p2(qz) = ,02 and 2's unique Bayesian strategy is r2(yz) = 1/(1 + a�M-2y2). 
Thus ( r1( '), r2( ')) is an equilibrium of Bayesian strategies for the more general game but not a 
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Bayesian equilibrium in a Bayesian game. 
The fixed point property of Theorem 1 does not depend on signal ordering assumptions such 
as the "monotone ratio property," "good news," or "affinity." Signal ordering assumptions play an 
important role, not in the fixed point characterization of Bayesian strategies, but in limiting the 
number of fixed points and obtaining the "regret free" property. This property is defined as follows. 
Suppose r i  (-) is a Bayesian strategy (by definition for each initial private information
Yi, r i  (yi) maximizes the full expectation E [ti (r i  ,qi ,X)] given by (1 . 1). Suppose that after reporting
ri (yi ), i observes qi and conditions on the new information. His expected transfer is
1 
Ri (r i  ,qi) = f E [ti (r i  ,qi, X )  Ip ,q;]h;(p I qi )dp
0 
Then we say i 's Bayesian strategy ri (-) is regret free under the mechanism t if
Vyi e Yi, V qi e [0,1] ri (yi) maximizes Ri (r i  ,qi) 
over r i  e [0,1] 
( 1.8) 
( 1 .9) 
The intuitive idea is that for given initial information Yi*, the Bayesian strategy ri * 
(satisfying (1 . 1)) may not remain optimal once the additional information qi is observed (may not
satisfy ( 1 .9)). Green and Laffont suggest that regret free2 is a useful property because it without
individuals may anticipate future regret and "vitiate" their initially optimal Bayesian strategies 
(perhaps leading to the "intertemporal tussle" described by Strotz [1955-6] in another context). 
However, for any probability revealing mechanism which provides an incentive for i to
reveal information, eventual regret is unavoidable, as long as i eventually observes X . (To see this 
note that if, for every fixed qi, r;" maximizes both ti (r i  ,qi ,1) and ti (r i  ,qi ,0), then i has an incentive to
report r i  = r;" no matter what his initial information y; and later information qi.) In contrast, as we
shall see, Groves mechanisms and k'" price auctions can be permanently regret free.
Theorem 2. For any pivot mechanism, if P;O has a unique fixed point then i's Bayesian strategy is
regret free. 
Proof Under a pivot mechanism i's expected transfer, after observing q ; and conditioned on q;, is 
by ( 1 .2) and (1 .8),  omitting subscript i, 
{p(q)A(q)-p(q)qA(q) + (B1 -B'J)p(q) +B2 
R(r ,q) = 
qA (q)-p(q)qA (q) + (B1 +B'J)p(q) +B2 
ifr �q 
if r < q
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Assumer• is the unique fixed point of p(·) . If r • = 0, then p(q) < q for all q > 0, otherwise
by continuity there would be at least one additional fixed point. If r > 0, then by uniqueness
p (0) > o. Hence for q < r •, p(q) > q, for otherwise would require at least one more fixed point.
Similarly if r = I ,  then p(q) > q for all q <I and if r <I thenp(q) < q for q > r. Thus
-( ) > • > p q �q as r �q 
We must show, for all r and q thatR (r ,q) ::!: R(r ,q). If r ::!: q thenp(q) ::!: q and R(r ,q) ::!:R(r ,q). 
If r <q thenp(q)<q andR(r,q)::!:R(r,q). Q.E.D. 
2. FIXED POINTS IN PREFERENCE REVELATION
In deriving the corresponding fixed point and regret-free properties for the Groves
mechanism and for the kilt price auction, I follow the development of Green and Laffont (pp. 39-43),
modifying the notation a little to bring out the parallel. In the public good model write K = 1 if the
public good is produced and K = O if not. Write wi for i's reported willingness to pay and qi = - I:.wi 
}"'4 
for the negative of the sum of others' reported willingnesses to pay. The Groves decision function is 
to produce the good (K = 1) if� wi ::!: 0, or equivalently if wi ::!: q i , and not to produce the good (K = O) 
J 
if Wi <qi• 
The Groves transfer mechanism is the function t = (t 1, • • •  , t") where
{
-qi +Hi if w; ::!: q;
t; = 
Hi if wi <qi 
where H; is an arbitrary function of others' reported willingnesses to pay. 
When K = 1, i gets vi utility from the public good; when K = 0, i gets 0 utility from the
unproduced public good. With additive, separable utility, i's utility is 
, I I I I I {v· -q· +H· ifw· ::!: q· 
U'= 
Hi ifwi <qi 
Typically, although not often explicitly, it is assumed that i knows his true valuation vi with 
certainty. We relax this assumption. Suppose for example, that the proposed public good is a dam
and i's valuation depends upon the unknown future state, which describes among other things 
whether it will be dry or rainy in the next ten years. In this more general case i expresses his
uncertainty as to his own valuation, and the sum of the others' willingness to pay by a pdf hi (vi ,qj ) . 
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Corresponding to Section 1, we define the for the public good model: 
.. 
f;(Yj) = f hi(Vi,qi)dqi 
.. 
gi(qi) = f hi(Vi,qi)dvi 
.. 
Vi= Ei(vi) = f vJi(vi)dv; 
Vj(q;) =E;(V; lq;) 
Theorem 3. For the Groves mechanism, if Vj(') is continuous and g;(') > 0, then i's Bayesian strategy
exists and is a fixed point of V;(·). 
Proof Write V; = U; -H;. Since Hi is not a function of w;, i's maximizing of his expected utility is
the same as maximizing V;. Omitting the subscript i, 
.. ..  
E(V)=T(w)=f f Vh(v,q)dvdq 
� w � � 
= f dv f ( v -q )h ( v ,q )dq + f dv f (O)h ( v ,q )dq 
w .. 
= f dq f ( v -q )h ( v ,q )dv 
w -
-- w 
=f g(q)dqf (v -q)hv1q(v lq)dv 
w 
= f (v(q)-q)g(q)dq (2.1) 
Note (2.1) is in the same fonn as (1.4). If max T(w) is attained for finite w· we must have
v(w • ) = w • .  If there is no finite fixed point either T monotonically increases as w � oo, with
v(w) > w, in which case we write w· = oo maximizes T and v(oo) = oo; or T monotonically decreases,
with v(w) < w, in which case we write w • = -oo and v(-oo) = -oo. Q.E.D. 
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And in parallel to Theorem 2 we have: 
Theorem 4. For the Groves mechanism, if ViO has a unique fixed point, then i's Bayesian strategy is 
regret free. 
Proof Omitting subscript i, i's expected utility after observing q is 
{v(q) - q + H if w '2:. q (and K = 1) 
R (w,q) = 
H ifw < q  (andK =0) 
and the proof is similar to Theorem 2. .Q.E.D. 
Theorems 3 and 4 can be reinterpreted for ktlt price auctions as follows. Define qi as the k11i
highest bid of the bidders other than i and wi as i's bid. Write Ki = 1 if i receives one of the k 
identical goods and Ki = O if not. If wi > q;, then K; = 1; if wi < qi, then K; = 0. If w; =qi, then the tie 
is broken by lottery; if i wins the lottery K; = 1, if not K; = 0. Bidder i's transfer is -qi if K; = l, and 
O if Ki = o. Assuming linear separable utility, i's utility is ui = v ;  -qi if K; = l, and Ui = O if K; = O .
Then, Theorems 3 and 4 go through as before, but for  kt1t price auctions.3
For a Groves mechanism (or a kt1t price auction), if there is a unique fixed point to Vi('), i not
only is regret free after observing q;, but also after observing K (or K; ). Once i reports w; and 
observes qi he infers K (or Ki). Thus he obtains no new information by observing K (or K;) and 
remains regret free. This is in contrast with pivot mechanism for probability revelation. Here X is 
not a direct function of r; and qi and i learns additional information upon observing X. Thus we see 
that although there is a strong parallel between pivot mechanisms for probability revelation and 
pivot mechanisms for preference revelation, the parallel is not complete. 
An important special case for the public good model is when i's valuation is known by i 
with certainty and does not depend on qi (v i is a constant known to i). Then Vi(qi) = v ;  (for all
q; ), Vi =v i and the fixed point of Vi(') is v ;. For this case i's Bayesian strategy is to report wi = v ;  =Vi, 
i.e., for i to reveal his true willingness to pay. This is the standard result which says that when v ;  is
constant and knbwn to i, i has a truthful dominant strategy. 4 
The preceding analysis suggests a possible interpretation of how Bayesian and rational 
expectations equilibria are related. (I hasten to add that the interpretation to follow is not the 
standard one of a rational expectations equilibrium.) Typically in the definition of a rational 
expectations equilibrium it is assumed that each i can condition on a public signal at the same time 
he contributes to it. There are several problems with this idea. As is well known, there can be a 
"paradox" of research incentives. As a practicai problem there are few institutions for which an 
individual can simultaneously contribute to a public signal and condition on it.5
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To develop an alternative concept of a rational expectations equilibrium, we keep the idea 
that each i both contributes to and conditions on a public signal, but we give up the idea that each i 
does so simultaneously. Let q = - � wj in the public good model, q be the (k + 1)'" price in the
J 
auction model, and q = � r/n and q; = "!-.rjl(n - 1) in the probability model.
J J"' 
Assume that q is made public after i reports w; (or r; in the probability revelation model).
In each model once i observes the public signal q he can infer q;. Now consider the following two 
step process, which we describe for the public good model, omitting the corresponding discussion 
for kt1t price auctions and probability revelation.
In the first step, i observes y;°, forms his Bayesian strategy r; ('), and takes the action of
reporting w;* = r; (y;°). After taking this action the signal q • becomes publicly available. In the
second step i conditions on Yt and q;° and he may or may not experience regret. If all i are regret
free we interpret the n -tuple (w;, ... , w;) as a rational expectations equilibrium. The idea is that if i 
could modify his action after learning q • he would have no incentive to do so. 6 
. Under this interpretation (w;, ... , w;) could be a rational expectations equilibrium without
being a Bayesian equilibrium (one or more of Al, A2, or C3 might not hold yeti is regret free, as in
Example 3). Or (wr, . . .  , w;) could be a Bayesian equilibrium with no regret and hence a rational
expectations equilibrium (as in Examples 1 and 2). Or (wr , ... , w:> could be a Bayesian equilibrium
without being a rational expectations equilibrium, or neither. 
A possible drawback from the above interpretation is that it seems to exclude learning. 
However, we can think of learning as an iterative process. In the first step of the first iteration i 
observes his private information and takes an action. In the second step of the first iteration, i
observes an aggregate public signal and updates his current posterior probabilities. In the first step
of the second iteration i takes a second action. In the second step he observes another aggregate 
signal and updates his information. And so iterative process goes. Compared with later information 
an earlier action may no longer be optimal (it may be regretted). The process may eventually reach a 
stage where the previous action remains optimal under the new information. The process may then 
be in an equilibrium, with no new information being generated, and learning stops. The interesting 
thing about the Groves mechanism is that even though it is defined for only one iteration, it achieves 
this regret free property at the first step, if the V; O have unique fixed points. 
3. CHARACTERIZING PROPER SCORING RULES AS PIVOT MECHANISMS
We define a scoring rule for X as a transfer mechanism 
{F(r;)ifX=l 
I
;= 
G(r;) if X =0
(3.1) 
Note that a scoring rule, applied to i, depends only on i's report and X, and not on the others' 
reports. Write i's expected transfer E[t; lri] = S (r;) = jj;F(r;) + (1-fi;)G (r;). For convenience we
denote a. scoring rule by (F ,G ). A (strictly) proper scoring rule for Xis a scoring rule for which i 
(uniquely) maximizes his expected transfer by reporting P; his unconditioned expectation of the 
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probability of X. As part of the definition we assume that proper scoring rules are at least minimally 
responsive in the sense that F (1) '# F (0) and G (0) '# G (1). Minimal responsiveness insures that when
P; == 1, i is not indifferent between reporting 0 and 1, and similarly when Pi == 0.
For a risk neutral assessor i, strictly proper scoring rules elicit P;; while pivot mechanisms
elicit a fixed point of 'ii;(·). We know that whenfi(p)gi(qi) = hi(p ,qi), the fixed point of ii; O is Pi . 
Thus it might be possible to view proper scoring rules as special cases of pivot mechanisms. The 
specialization would correspond the specialization in the public good model where there are fixed 
private valuations (vi is constant) and i's Bayesian strategy specializes to wi =Vi. Theorem 5 
confirms the parallel (at least where differentiability is not a problem). 
Theorem 5. Let (F ,G) be a twice differentiable, proper scoring rule. Then for any informatio!1 Yi
and any report ri, (F ,G) is equivalent in expectation to the pivot mechanism where 
A(qi) =A= 1/(F(l)- F(O) + G(O)-G(l)) 
gi (qi)= (F '(qi) - G '(qi ))IA and gi (qi)/ (p) = h; (p ,q;) 
Proof. (Omit subscript i .) By the definition of a proper scoring rule F (1) > F (0) and G (0) > G (1) soI I 
O <A < oo, To check that g (·) is well defined as a pdf, note f g (q )dq = A
l f (F '(q) - G '(q )dq = 1.
0 0 
Also the FOC for max S (r) is p(F'(r)-G '(r)) =-G '(r) . By the definition of a proper scoring rule, 
for eachp the max is attained at r= p, so G'(r)=-rg(r)A, and S '(r)=pg(r)A - rg(r)A. So 
S"(r) = (p - r)g'(r)A - g(r)A. For S to be a maximum at r = p, we must have S"(p) � O; hence 
g(r) ;?:0. 
Next we check the equivalence in expectation. Since q and p are assymed independent,
p(q) = p and ( 1 .3) specializes to T(r) = p(Af (1 - q )g (q)dq + B 1) + (1 -p)(Af qg (q)dq + B ')) and
T '(r) = <P - r )Ag (r ). So for each p and r, TCr) and S (r) differ at most by a co"nstant k. But when
p = 1, T (0) = B 1 and S (0) = F (0) = B i. so k = 0.
Write 
W(p)=p(At(l- q)g(q)dq +B1)+(1-p)(A(qg(q)dq +Bi)
0 p 
Q.E.D. 
(3.2) 
for i's expected transfer, as a function of p, when i reports his maximizing r = p. Then it is easy to 
check that W "(p) =Ag (p). 
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Define a normalized scoring rule as a scoring rule where F (0) = G (1) = O and F (1) + G (0) = 1.
To illustrate a nonnalized proper scoring rule as in Figure 4 note that the pivot mechanism 
representation of a nonnalized proper scoring rule has A = l, and B 1 = B 2 = O; further
W (0) = - W'(O) = G (0) and W (1) = W'(l) = F (1).
Theorem 5 is a representation theorem showing the close connection between pivot 
mechanisms and proper scoring rules. A principal can choose among two types of pivot 
mechanisms. If the principal defines q; to be a function if the others' reports, he has an interactive
pivot mechanism, with Bayesian strategy as analyzed in Section 1. If the principal defines q; to be a
random variable, drawn independently of p, he has a non-interactive pivot mechanism, equivalent in
expectation to a proper scoring rule.7 
4. BAYESIAN STRATEGIES WITHOUT RISK NEUTRALITY
In this section we weaken the assumption of risk neutrality for normalized pivot mechanisms
to a weaker assumption of monotonicity, defined as follows. Suppose i faces two lotteries. In the
first lottery he has probability p of winning a valued prize and probability 1 -p of winning nothing.
In the second lottery he has probability p' of winning the same prize, and 1 -p' of winning nothing.
Then we can say i has monotonic preferences if he prefers the first lottery to the second when
P >p'.s
For nonnalized pivot mechanisms where A; (q;) = 1, B 1; = B 2i = 0, we have 0 � t; � 1. So we
can define a lottery version of a nonnalized pivot by 
{ 1 with probability t; 
t; 
1 
= 
0 with probability 1 - t; 
Then all the theorems go through as before but with the assumption of risk neutrality replaced by
monotonicity, and with what was previously an expected transfer now the probability of winning a
zero-one lottery. 9 
5. APPLICATIONS OF PIVOT :MECHANISMS IN REVEALING PROBABILITY
Applications of pivot mechanisms for revealing preferences have been intensively studied. 
In this section we look at a few applications of pivot mechanisms for revealing probability.
The first application arises when a principal wants the revelation mechanism to pool 
infonnation. Suppose that the principal knows that the infonnation structure is that of Example 1, 
except he does not know M .  The principal knows from (1.5) that if he uses an interactive pivot
mechanism, where q; = 'i U ¢ i), and the assessors have symmetric Bayesian strategies, the principal
will elicit 
1 +2yj 
r· =---
1 2+2M 
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The principal also knows that by taldng the average (r 1 + r-))12 , he will obtain the pooled information
l+y1+Y2 expectation ofp which isE[p ly1 ,yiJ= 2+2M ·
In contrast, if the principal uses a proper scoring rule, he will elicit
- 1 +Yi 
Pi =ri = 2+M 
But there is no aggregation of r 1 and r 2 which yields the full infonnation expectation. 1 O
Similarly, suppose the principal knows that the infonnation structure is that of Example 2, 
but he does not know M. Then if he uses an interactive pivot mechanism where qi = 'i and the
assessors have symmetric Bayesian strategies, then the principal knows he can obtain the pooled 
infonnation expectation by taldng the geometric mean of the reported odds (1- r1)/r1 and (1- r-))lr2 
(this can be verified from (1 .6) and ( 1 .7)). But if the principal uses a proper scoring rule he cannot 
find an aggregation of the elicited r1 and r2 (from (1 .6)) which yields the full infonnation
expectation. These two examples show that there are at least some cases where an interactive pivot
mechanism aggregates infonnation better than a proper scoring rule (i.e., a non-interactive pivot
mechanism). 
A second application arises when a principal wants to choose a proper scoring rule to 
maximize research incentives for an assessor, per unit expected cost to the principal. We derive the 
optimal rule by two lemmas. By Theorem 5 and (3.2), the expected transfer for a nonnalized proper 
scoring rule can be written, for the Bayesian strategy r = p 
W(p) = pt(I -q) g(q)dq + (1-p)( qg(q)dq
0 p 
(5.1) 
Assessor i can simply reveal his current p ,  or undertake research to update p. Suppose, if he 
undertakes research, the research is positive, and his new expectation of p is Pb > p .  And suppose, if 
the new research is negative, his new expectation of p is Pa < p . Write the probability of a positive
research finding as a. (Then of course apb + (1- a)p0 = p). Then the expected value of infonnation
(VOi) is 
(5.2) 
Lemma 1. If i's expectation of p is currently p ,  the nonnalized proper scoring rule which maximizes
i's expected VOi is characterized by a g (') fully concentrated at p .  
Proof Applying (5.1) to (5.2) 
p 1 1 
VO/= a(pbj b g(q)dq + f qg(q)dq -Pbf qg(q)dq)0 Pb 0 
p 1 1 
+ (l -a)(p0J 0 g(q)dq + J qg(q)dq -pJ qg(q)dq)0 Pa 0 
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- I I 
-p( g(q)dq -f qg(q)dq +pf qg(q)dq
0 p 0 
-
= a(b (pb - q )g (q )dq + (1-a)( (q -Pa)g (q )dq
p 
I 
We are looking for a function g(·) which maximizes (5.3) subject to f g(q)dq = 1 and
(5.3) 
g (');;:: O .  This is an isoperimetric control problem and its solution is a g (') ftill� concentrated atcf.E.D. 
Lemma 2. If i's expectation of p is currently p, the normalized proper scoring rule which minimizes 
the principal's expected cost, without research when i reports r = p, is characterized by a g (')fully
concentrated at p .  
Proof. Th e  principal's expected cost is 
W =pf (1-q)g(q)dq + (I-p)( qg(q)dq
0 p 
I 
(5.4) 
We are looking for a g(') which minimizes (4.5) subject to f g(q)dq = 1 and g(');;:: O. This is
0 
another isoperimetric control problem and its solution is a g(·) fully concentrated atp. Q.E.D. 
Putting the two lemmas together, we have: 
Theorem 6. If i's current expectation of p is p, the proper scoring rule which maximizes i's VOI per
unit expected cost to the principal is characterized by a g (') fully concentrated at p. 
The proof is immediate since the constants A , B 1 and B 2 simply act as scaling factors.
For Theorem 6 to be useful, the principal must know i 's current ii;, the pivot. The principal 
might have acquired knowledge of p; from a previous use of a proper scoring rule. In other cases the
principal might not know the current ii;. An attractive feature of the interactive pivot mechanism is
that it may allow the principal to achieve some of the benefits of Theorem 6, in stronger research 
incentives, without the principal himself knowing the current p's of the assessors. If i believes that 
the consensus of others is likely to be close to his own current p;-a plausible assumption-he will 
feel some of the incentives described in Theorem 6. From ( 1 .4), with A (q) = 1 
T"(r) = (ji'(r)-l)g(r) + (ji(r)-r)g'(r). 
Thus i 's expected transfer function at the point r = p (r) (his Bayesian report) has convexity
(ji'(r) -l)g (r ). The more concentrated g (r) at the point of i's current Bayesian report, the greater
the convexity and greater i's incentive to undertake research which might revise his expectation of 
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p. Conversely the more sensitive i's conditional expectation P; (q;) to q; (the closer 'iii(·) to the
diagonal in Figure l, the smaller the convexity and the smaller i's research incentives. 
We can see how these two factors trade off in Examples (1) and (2). Table 1 compares the 
interactive pivot mechanism with qi = 'i to four of the most well known proper scoring rules. In 
each case in Table 1 assessor l's information is specified by M 1=5. Assessor 2's information is
better, with M 2 = 10 or M 2 = 15. For Example (2), the case is taken for a= 0.5 and P = 0.6. The
differences in expected transfers, as a percent of assessor 1 's expected transfer are shown in Table 1 .  
(Comparing the expected transfers in relative terms normalizes differences in  expected transfers 
among the various rules and provides a measure of the relative incentives to undertake research.) As 
can be seen for the two examples, the interactive pivot mechanism provides a considerably higher 
relative expected transfer, compared with the other mechanisms, and thus relatively stronger research 
incentives. 
As a final observation, whenA;(q;) = 2/q;(l - qi) and Bik =-2 (i = l, . . .  , n ;  k = 1, 2), the pivot
mechanism specializes to 
ti =
2/qi -2 
-2 
2/(1- qi)-2 
-2 
ifX = 1 andri '2:.qi
if X = 0 and ri '2:. qi
if X = 0 and ri < qi 
if X = 1 and r; < q;
This payoff structure is the same as for a parimutuel betting rule, for a race of two horses, at the 
$2.00 betting window, with the following interpretation and modification. Write ri = 1 for "ith bet on 
horse l," r; = O for "ith bet on horse 2," and X = 1 for "horse 1 wins." Write qi for the fraction of the
total betting pool, aside from bet i, on horse 1 ,  and q for the fraction of the total pool (including i) 
on horse 1 .  (A single bettor can be associated with many $2.00 bets). In the parimutuel bet the i th 
strategy space is restricted to {O, 1 }, and Ai(q;) is replaced with Ai (q) = 2/q (1 - q }-this last 
difference between qi and q is lost in the round-off error when there are thousands of bets. More
importantly, q is a signal, made public during the betting period (q is the current odds on the 
totalizer). Thus to a limited extent a bettor can do what is often assumed in a rational expectations 
model-he can ·condition on the public signal at the same time he contributes to it. In reaction to the
odds on the totalizer a bettor is free to add new bets. But his ability to recontract is limited because 
he cannot cancel the old ones. 1 1
In a similar way it may be possible to model other markets, where individuals take actions
based on private information and public prices, part of the private information becomes incorporated 
into new prices, and then individuals use the new public information to augment their private
information and take new actions, and so on. 
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TABLE 1 
RELATIVE VALUE OF INFORMATION: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
ASSESSOR 2 's EXPECTED TRANSFER AND ASSESSOR l's EXPECTED
TRANSFER AS A PERCENT OF ASSESSOR l's EXPECTED TRANSFER 
Non-interactive Proper 
Scoring Rules 
Interactive 
M2 Pivot Sphere Brier Log Marschak 
Information 10  12.4 5.2 1 .2 .8  .8 
Structure of 
Example ( 1) 15  1 8.7 7.3 1 .7  1 . 1  1.1
Information 10  28.9 5 . 1  4.1 2.3 2.5 
Structure of 
Example (2) 15  57.1 9. 1 7.3 4.3 4.5 
Notes 
The proper scoring rules are defined by: 
F(r) G(r) 
Sphere r/vr2+(1-r)2 (1 -r )/V r2 + (1 - r )2
Brier 2 r  -r2 1-r2 
Log /og(r) log (1-r) 
Marschak 1 w.p. r 0 w.p. r
z w.p. 1-r z w.p. 1-r
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For the Marschak. rule, z is a unifonn random variable on [0,1] (see Becker et al. [1964]). 
Grether' s [ 1981] proper scoring rule can be shown to be a lottery version of the Marschak. rule, with 
the same expectation. McKelvey and Page [ 1985] used a lottery version of the Brier rule. To bound 
the range of the Logarithmic rule, the rule was truncated by setting r = .02 for r < .02 . The truncated
rule is not proper for r < .02 but there is little effect of the truncation in Table 1 since r < .02 arises
infrequently for Example (2) and not at all for Example (1) . 
For M 1 :t'- M 2 I modified the assumption of symmetric strategy functions. I assumed that the
strategies are "symmetrically asymmetric," in the sense that M 1ri1(')=M2r[
1 (·) . This reduces to the
symmetric case when M 1=M2 and provides rj
1 (·) and r21 (') having full ranges compared with the
expectations on the full information y1 + y2• This assumption yields Bayesian strategies of
'1 = (1+(1+M1/M i)y1)/(2 +MI+ Mi) and '2 = (1 + (1+MiM1)yi)/(2 +M1+M2) for Example (1) and
1/(1 M1+M2-2y1(1+MiM1>1 d 1/(1 AM1+M2-2y2(l+M1/M�] .s- E 1 (2) r 1 = + � an r 2 = + _e J.Or xamp e .
The expectations in Table 1 are calculated by a Monte Carlo method. 
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APPENDIX 
In the following example there is an asymmetric Bayesian equilibrium, which satisfies the 
fixed point property of Theorem 3, but not Milgrom's and Milgrom and Weber's signal ordering 
assumptions. The example is for a second price auction; analogous examples can be constructed for 
Theorem 1 .  
Let n = 2 and Y1=Y2 = Y = {l,2,3}. Suppose Pr(y1,y:i) i s  given by  Table Al; from Table Al 
Pr(y2 I y1) are easily calculated in Table A2.
Yt 
TABLE Al 
Pr(ylty:i) 
Y2 
.01 .01 .01
. 10  .26 . 16  
.01 .43 .01 
Define v 1 and v 2 by
1 if y 1 = 1 or y 2 = 1 
4 if(y1,y:i)=(2,3)or (3,2)
7 if(y1,Y:i)=(3,3) 
10 if <Y1.Y:0 = (2,2) 
ify2=l 
if y2 = 3 
if y2 = 2 
Yt 
TABLEA2 
Pr(y2IY1) 
Y2 
.33 .33 .33 
. 1 9  .50 .3 1 
.02 .96 .02 
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To check that the signals are not affiliated consider the two pairs of signals (y 1,yi) = (2,2) and 
(y1>yi) = (1,3). By Milgrom (p. 1098, 1982) (2,2) v (1,3) = (2,3) and (2,2) /\ (1,3) = (1,2), and for 
affiliation we must have Pr(2,3) ·Pr (1,2) �Pr (2,2) ·Pr (1,3). But (.16)(.01) < (.26)(.01) so the signals
are not affiliated. 
To check that the signal ordering property does not obtain, we compute 
Pr(v1=1 I y1=2) = 0.19, Pr(v1=4 I y1=2) = 0.31, Pr(v1=1 I y1=3) = 0.02 and
Pr (v 1 = 4 I y 1 = 3) = 0.96. Clearly the conditional distribution Pr (v 1 I y1 = 2) does not stochastically
dominate Pr (v 1 I y 1 = 3), or vice versa. So y 1 = 2 is not more "favorable" to assessor 1 then y 1 = 3, or 
vice versa, and there is no signal ordering property. 
To check that the monotone likelihood ratio property does not hold note that 
Pr(y1=2 I v1=7)/Pr(y1=2 I V1=lO)=O/ l=O andPr(y1=3 I V1=7)/Pr(y1=3 I V1=10)=1!0=00•
So for increasing y 1 the likelihood ratio increases and the monotone likelihood ratio property does
not obtain. 
Nonetheless we can still use the discrete version of Theorem 3 to find a Bayesian 
equilibrium. First note that when Mr. 2 observes y2 he knows his valuation with certainty. Thus he 
can do no better than report w2(1) = 1, w2(2) = 8, and w2(3) = 7. Write w;(') for this reporting
function, which is Mr. 2 's dominant strategy. 
Next, we plot v1 (') for each y 1 .in Figure A 1: 
[Figure Al here] 
By Theorem 3, candidates for Mr. l's best response to w; (·) are shown by the circled dots. When
y1 = 2 calculations of l's expected utility shows that w1(2) = 10 is a better response than w1(2) = 1. So 
define the function w; (·) by w; (1) = 1, w; (2) = 10, and w; (3) = 7. Direct calculation confirms that
(w; ('),w; (')) is a Bayesian equilibrium.
22 
FOOTNOTES 
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Foundation. I would like to thank John Ferejohn, Leonid Hurwicz, Lode Li, Richard
McKelvey, Roger Noll, and Jennifer Reinganum for many helpful comments.
1 .  A problem can arise if P; (·) is not upper semi-continuous, and Pi (·) jumps across the diagonal at 
a mass point of g ;(·). In this case there may be no maximum.
2. The condition of "regret free" is the same as the condition of "posterior optimal" in Green and
Laffont [ 1985) under the proviso that q; is the only additional information i receives. "Regret
free" is also the same as Milgrom 's "no regret" under the proviso that the (k + 1) price is the
only additional information each bidder receives.
3. Theorem 3 is similar to Milgrom's [ 198 1) Theorem 3. 1 or Milgrom and Weber's [ 1 982)
Theorem 6. The main difference is that the fixed point property established in this paper does
not depend on signal ordering assumptions.
4. See for example, Theorem 3. 1 of Green and Laffont [ 1979).
5 .  In some economic experiments individuals are allowed to submit strategies which are
conditional on a later-to-be revealed public signal, which in tum depends on everyone's 
conditional report. For example in the Groves mechanism, individuals sometimes submit a 
reported demand curve. With such an institutional arrangement the simultaneity condition can 
be met. In Section 5, I note that the parimutuel mechanism meets the simultaneity condition in
a limited way. 
6. Recall that for the probability model i will not in general remain regret free after observing X,
but in the qroves mechanism and the kt1t price auction, i is regret free after observing K,  if he is
regret free after observing q .
7. As a scoring rule depends only on an agent's report and a random variable, it corresponds to an
"independent contract" in Green and Stokey [ 1983) , (see pp. 353-4). In an interactive pivot
mechanism i wins or loses, depending on others' actions as in a "tournament," but i 's winning
does not solely depend on rank order; hence an interactive pivot mechanism does not closely
correspond to a "tournament."
8 .  The monotonicity condition i s  the same as Assumption 6 in Luce and Raiffa [ 1957) . 
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9. The idea of "paying off' in probabilities can be traced back to Savage ( 1971 ] ,  Smith (196 1 ] ,
and Marschak ( 1975]. In an experiment Grether ( 1981] used a mechanism which is a lottery
version of Marschak's proper scoring rule, and is an application of the idea. McKelvey and
Ordeshook ( 1984] also "paid in probabilities" in an experimental setting.
10. To see this consider case 1 ,  where M = 1 and y1 = y2 = O. Then under a proper scoring rule
r1=r2=1/ 3. In case 2, M = 4 and y 1=y2=1. Then under a proper scoring rule r1=r2=113.
But in case 1 the full infonnation expectation is 1/4, but in case 2 it is 3/10.
1 1 . For an analysis of how the parimutuel rule aggregates infonnation see McKelvey and Page 
( 1985]. 
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